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Abstract
The Venice Commission in its Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters spec-
ifies that (single-seat) constituencies should be drawn so that the size difference
of a constituency’s size from the average should not exceed a fixed limit while
its borders must not cross the borders of administrative regions, such as states
or counties.
Assuming that constituencies are of equal size within each of the administra-
tive regions, the problem is equivelent to the apportionment problem, that is,
the proportional allocation of voting districts among the administrative regions.
We show that the principle of maximum admissible departure is incompatible
with common apportionment properties, such as monotonicity and Hare-quota.
When multiple apportionments satisfy the smallest maximum admissible
departure property we find a unique apportionment by the repeated application
of the property. The allotment such that the differences from the average district
size are lexicographically minimized can be found using an efficient algorithm.
This apportionment rule is a well-defined allocation mechanism compatible with
and derived from the recommendation of the Venice Commission. Finally, we
compare this apportionment rule with mainstream mechanisms using data from
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Hungary, Germany and the United States.
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1. Introduction
Fair representation is the cornerstone of representative democracies. The
idea that each congressmen should represent the same number of citizens is as
old as the United States. We study the so-called apportionment problem (for
recent texts see Pukelsheim, 2014 or Chapter 1 of Kubiak, 2009): sharing a5
given number of seats among a given set of regions with known populations
in a fair way and look for mechanisms that provide a unique solution to each
problem. Such a unique solution leaves no room for political bargaining and
manipulation in designing or updating the legal framework for elections.
The stakes at the elections are very high and therefore the codification of10
any electoral law should be done with great care. Seemingly an easy problem,
establishing electoral districts1 with equal numbers of voters becomes nontriv-
ial, when they must fit into the existing administrative structure of a country.
There are alternative ways to approach the problem, generating a constant de-
bate even in countries with well-established democracies such as the United15
States. (For a comprehensive historical overview see Balinski and Young, 1982).
A new entrant to this debate, the European Commission for Democracy through
Law, better known as the Venice Commission published a comprehensive guide-
book on good electoral laws in 2002. The Code of Good Practice in Electoral
Matters (Venice Commission, 2002a) – consequently used in reviewing Albania’s20
and Estonia’s electoral law in 2011 (OSCE/ODIHR, 2011; Venice Commission
and OSCE/ODIHR, 2011) and forming an apparent basis to the modifications
1Voting terminology differs from country to country: We use electoral district or con-
stituency interchangeably to refer to a geographical area, the people and especially the voters
living there who elect one or more representatives. For simplicity we focus on single-seat
voting districts.
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Hungary introduced to in its electoral law in 2012 –, contains original recom-
mendations for a good practice of apportionment.
“Equality in voting power, where the elections are not being25
held in one single constituency, requires constituency boundaries to
be drawn in such a way that seats in the lower chambers represent-
ing the people are distributed equally among the constituencies, in
accordance with a specific apportionment criterion, e.g. the number
of residents in the constituency, the number of resident nationals30
(including minors), the number of registered electors, or possibly
the number of people actually voting ... Constituency boundaries
may also be determined on the basis of geographical criteria and
the administrative or indeed historic boundary lines, which often
depend on geography ... The maximum admissible departure from35
the distribution criterion adopted depends on the individual situa-
tion, although it should seldom exceed 10% and never 15%, except
in really exceptional circumstances (a demographically weak admin-
istrative unit of the same importance as others with at least one
lower-chamber representative, or concentration of a specific national40
minority).” (Venice Commission, 2002a, §§13–15 in Section 2.2)
Similar conditions are common, though not universal. In Georgia, where
the electoral law of 1999 did not set rules about the sizes of constituencies, the
number of voters per (single-seat) constituency ranged from some 3,600 voters
in the Lent’ekhi district or 4,200 in the Kazbegi districts to over 138,000 in45
Kutaisi City giving multiple times more influence to voters from Lent’ekhi or
the Kazbegi district than to those from Kutaisi City. The report of the Venice
Commission arrived to the conclusion that huge deviations like this question
the fairness of the whole election process (Venice Commission, 2002b). On the
other hand, in the United States, theoretically, no deviations from the equality50
of constituencies are permitted; “other common thresholds are 5 percent (e.g.,
New Zealand, Albania, and Yemen); 10 percent (e.g., Australia, Italy, and the
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Ukraine); 15 percent (e.g., Armenia, Germany, and the Czech Republic) and
20 percent (e.g., Zimbabwe and Papua New Guinea). In Canada, the indepen-
dent commissions charged with creating federal electoral districts are allowed to55
deviate by up to 25 percent from the provincial quotas, and even more under
‘extraordinary circumstances’.” (Handley, 2007). In Singapore the tolerance is
30%; a recent proposal to reform the constituency map of the United Kingdom
worked with a 5% permitted deviation from the average size (Balinski et al.,
2010). The draft version of the 2012 electoral law of Hungary adopted the Venice60
Commission’s recommendation almost word by word, but the 10-15% maximum
admissible departure between the population of any two constituency turned out
to be infeasible given the actual size of the parliament and the populations of
counties, if the constituencies cannot extend over county borders (Biro´ et al.,
2012; Bodna´r, 2012). Even with the subsequent relaxation, allowing a 15% (at65
most 20%) departure from the average size of constituencies in the final version,
the requirements were just met.
We take this maximum admissible departure property and compare it with
the properties that had been used to evaluate and judge apportionment meth-
ods. As generally there may be more than one apportionments satisfying this70
property, we look for apportionments where the maximum admissible depar-
ture is the lowest, then applying the same idea to the second largest difference,
and so on. The naturally emerging leximin apportionment is unique (up to
symmetries) and can be calculated using an efficient algorithm.
We focus on the simple setting where (1) districts elect single represen-75
tatives, (2) forming even constituencies within each of the regions is possible
and (3) representation is proportional. The results generalise directly to multi-
representative districts. In designing the constituencies of a region not only the
obvious integer problem (such as having two equal-sized constituencies in a re-
gion with odd population), but contiguity requirements and town and township80
boundaries too, create additional constraints that make the actual apportion-
ment a little less equal. How the actual borders of the constituencies are drawn
is yet another question. The strategic, manipulative design of voting districts,
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known as gerrymandering (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2010; Chambers and Miller,
2013) may happen with equally-sized districts, too. Last, we assume that the85
role of regions, states or counties is purely administrative and that they do
not have sovereign interests. If they do, representatives are likely to vote in
blocks and the effect on voting outcomes is no longer proportional to the size
of the region’s population, hence in larger problems there is a systematic bias
in favour of larger regions. The literature on voting power and power indices90
(Penrose, 1946, Shapley and Shubik, 1954 and Banzhaf, 1965; for a recent sur-
vey see Felsenthal and Machover, 1998) study weighted voting situations such
as the European Council of Ministers (Ko´czy, 2011), Penrose’s square root law
(Penrose, 1946) or the degressive proportionality (Laslier, 2012; Koriyama et al.,
2013) of the base+prop method (Pukelsheim, 2007) promoted in the Cambridge95
Compromise (Grimmett, 2012; Grimmett et al., 2011; Rose et al., 2012) and give
explicit recommendations on how to adjust for this. With the appropriate pop-
ulation adjustments, these problems, however, can be reduced to proportional
allocation.
In the following we first formalise the apportionment problem and critically100
discuss the (smallest) maximum admissible departure property. In Sections 4
and 5 we introduce the leximin solution for apportionment problems and then
apply this to apportionment problems from various countries: we compare the
leximin solution with the actual apportionment as outlined by the new electoral
law of Hungary and make a similar comparison for the German Bundestag and105
the United States House of Representatives. We conclude with a more technical
discussion of the related apportionment methods in literature.
2. The apportionment problem, mechanisms and their properties
An apportionment problem (p, H) is a pair consisting a vector
p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn)
of state populations, where P =
∑n
i=1 pi is the population of the country and
H denotes the number of seats in the legislature or House. Our task is to de-110
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termine the non-negative integers a1, a2, . . . , an with
∑n
i=1 ai = H representing
the number of constituencies in states 1, 2, . . . , n.
Let p ∈ Nn+ and a ∈ Nn be the n-dimensional vectors that contain the
population sizes and the allotted number of seats respectively (where N+ =
{1, 2, 3, . . . }). An apportionment method or rule is a function M that assigns an115
allotment for each apportionment problem (p, H). The fraction piP H is called the
respective share of state i. Throughout the paper we will employ the following
notation: let x,y ∈ Rn, we say that x ≥ y if xi ≥ yi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
In the following we introduce several properties of apportionments.
Quota. Proportional representation is seldom possible as the respective shares120
of the states are hardly ever integer numbers. However if such case occurs i.e.
the fractions ai =
pi
P H are integers for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} then the allotment a is
said to have the exact quota property.
In any other case taking one of the nearest integers to the exactly propor-
tional share is a natural choice. An allotment a satisfies lower (upper) quotas, if125
no state receives less (more) constituencies than the lower (upper) integer part
of its respective share, that is ai ≥
⌊
pi
P H
⌋
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and ai ≤
⌈
pi
P H
⌉
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, respectively.
An allotment satisfies the quota property if it satisfies both upper and lower
quota. Similarly we say that an apportionment method M(p, H) satisfies lower130
(upper) quota if for any apportionment problem (p,H), M(p, H)i ≥ bpiP Hc or
M(p, H)i ≤ dpiP He respectively for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and satisfies quota if it
satisfies both of them.
Monotonicity. The individual states should not lose seats when more seats are
available in the House. Formally:135
Definition 1. An apportionment rule M is house-monotonic if M(p, H ′) ≥
M(p, H) for any apportionment problem (p, H) and House sizes H ′ > H.
A scenario where increasing the House size would decrease the number of
seats allotted to a state is often considered undesirable, perhaps even paradoxi-
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cal. An apportionment rule where this is possible is said to exhibit the Alabama140
paradox referring to a historical occurrence of the phenomenon in the case of
state Alabama. A rule is said to be house-monotonic if it does not suffer from
such weakness.
There is a related monotonicity requirement and an associated paradox when
populations are considered. The population paradox arises when the population145
of two states increases at different rates. Then it is possible that the state with
more rapid growth actually loses seats to the state with slower growth. Table 3
presents an example where the population paradox emerges.
Definition 2. An apportionment rule M is population-monotonic if M(p′, H)i ≥
M(p, H)i for any House size H and population sizes p,p
′ such that p′i > pi,150
p′j > pj and
p′i
pi
≥ p
′
j
pj
while p′k = pk for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, k 6= i, j.
Note that this definition of population monotonicity is slightly stricter than
the one used in the literature in general, see for instance (Lauwers and Van Puyen-
broeck, 2008) or (Balinski and Young, 1982). However as we will see even this
strict property is violated by some rules.155
Balinski and Young (1975) provided a so-called Quota-method that is house-
monotonic and fulfills the quota property as well, but proved that no method
that is free from both Alabama and the population paradoxes satisfies quota
(Balinski and Young, 1982). In the next section we will provide examples ex-
hibiting these paradoxes.160
Smallest maximum admissible departure property. The next property character-
izes the recommendation2 made by the Venice Commission (2002a). Let a¯ = PH
2Although the Venice Commission is flexible on what kind of data should be the distribution
criterion based on, it is clear that the difference from the average value is to be minimized.
The most common interpretation is that there should be a limit on the allowable departure of
the average number of registered voters per constituency (see Handley (2007)). We follow this
practice as well, nevertheless our results hold in general, irrespective of the chosen reference
data.
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denote the average size of a constituency, let δi be the difference in percent-
age, displayed by the constituencies of state i and let di be its absolute value.
Formally165
δi =
pi
ai
− a¯
a¯
and di = |δi| (1)
Definition 3. An apportionment rule M satisfies the q-fixed maximum ad-
missible departure property if
∣∣∣∣ piM(p,H)i−a¯a¯ ∣∣∣∣ ≤ q for any apportionment problem
(p,H) and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
As we pointed out in the introduction European electoral laws impose a
fixed limit on maxi∈{1,...,n}{di} rather than minimizing it. The Venice Com-170
mission follows this practice as well. It can happen, however, that, given an
apportionment problem, no allotment exists that satisfy a certain limit, while
an allotment with smallest maximum admissible departure always exists. Thus
we focus on the latter concept. For a given apportionment problem (p, H) let
α(p,H) be the smallest maximum admissible departure that can be achieved with175
an allotment i.e.
α(p,H) = min
a∈A(n,H)
max
i∈{1,...,n}
{di} (2)
where A(n,H) denotes the set of n-dimensional non-negative vectors for which
the sum of the coordinates is H.
Definition 4. An apportionment rule M satisfies the smallest maximum admis-
sible departure property if
∣∣∣∣ piM(p,H)i−a¯a¯ ∣∣∣∣ ≤ α(p,H) for any apportionment problem180
(p,H) and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The philosophy behind the quota and the smallest maximum admissible de-
parture property is very similar, but not quite the same. The quota specifies how
many seats a state should receive at least and at most. If a state gets less than
its lower quota, then the allotment can be considered somewhat unfair from the185
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point of view of that particular state. The smallest maximum admissible depar-
ture property is concerned rather with the individual voter. If the population
sizes of the constituencies differ too much so does the voters’ influence. Not
surprisingly, the quota property plays more central role in the U.S. where the
states are large and highly independent. In Europe, where the countries consist190
of small and in some sense uniform counties, the smallest maximum admissible
departure property is more accepted.
3. The smallest maximum admissible departure property
In this section we review the basic features of the smallest maximum admis-
sible departure property. In the following we will omit the lower index of α(p,H)195
and write simply α. First let us note that α is not monotone decreasing in the
House size. To see this consider the allocation problem where p = (100, 200)
and let H = 3. Then it is possible to distribute the seats according to the
exact quota thus α = 0. However an increase of H by 1 renders both d1 and d2
positive.200
3.1. Upper bounds on the smallest maximum admissible departure
Obviously di is the smallest if state i receives either its lower or upper quota,
although it matters which one. Note that the closest integer to the respective
share not always yields the smallest difference from the average. Let us elabo-
rate on this relationship a little bit further. Let li =
⌊
pi
P H
⌋
and ui =
⌈
pi
P H
⌉
,205
respectively denote these quotas of state i and let βi denote the minimum dif-
ference achievable for state i. The maximum of these βi values, denoted by β,
is a natural lower bound for α. Formally:
βi = min
(∣∣∣∣ pili − a¯a¯
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣ piui − a¯a¯
∣∣∣∣), β = maxi∈N βi.
Empirical analysis shows that, in general, increasing H results in a lower α
ceteris paribus. The problem with small House sizes is that they imply a larger210
average constituency size. Divisibility issues can appear for smaller states that
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are only a few times as large as a¯. It can happen that the average size of the
constituencies of state i is equally far away from a¯ for both the lower and upper
integer part of Ppi , formally
pi
li
− a¯
a¯
=
a¯− piui
a¯
. (3)
For instance, if li = 2 and ui = 3 then pi =
12
5 a¯ and di = 0.2. A simple215
computation shows that, in general, if (3) holds, then di =
1
2li+1
. The Table 1
summarizes the problematic state population sizes.
li − ui p∗i βi
1− 2 43 a¯ 0.333
2− 3 125 a¯ 0.2
3− 4 247 a¯ 0.143
4− 5 409 a¯ 0.111
5− 6 6011 a¯ 0.091
Table 1: Critical state populations regarding divisibility. The first column shows the lower
and upper quotas, p∗i are the population levels where the minimal difference produced by
these is maximal, and βi is the corresponding worst case value of the minimal difference.
In other words, if there is a state with population 43 of the average con-
stituency size then α is at least 13 . For this value a lower d cannot be adhered220
to. One way to overcome this is to increase the house size H and thereby in-
crease the number of constituencies allocated to each state, in particular, to the
smallest state. Let i denote the smallest state and
γ
def
=

1
2li+1
if li 6= 0,
∞ if li = 0.
As the House size increases, li increases, and therefore γ decreases. Note
that γ is an upper bound for β but there is no obvious connection between γ225
and α. For instance, if we are able to distribute the seats according to the exact
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quota, then α is zero, but γ can be high. However let p1, p2 = 200 and p3 = 600
and let the House size equal to 7. Then γ = 13 , but α ≥ 0.4. We will further
analyze the relation of α, β and γ in Section 5 using real data.
3.2. Properties230
As we mentioned earlier, the quota and smallest maximum admissible de-
parture properties have different objectives. An apportionment method that
implements the latter will distribute less seats to a state than its lower quota
if the maximum admissible departure can be lowered in this way. Large states
serve as puffers where superfluous seats can be allocated or seats can be ac-235
quired if there are needed elsewhere as these do not change the average size of
constituencies dramatically. Table 2 demonstrates this process.
Method ⇒ Smallest max. adm. dep. quota
State Population seats piai δi seats
pi
ai
δi
A 26 3 8.666 −0.138 2 13 0.293
B 27 3 9 −0.104 3 9 −0.104
C 28 3 9.333 −0.071 3 9.333 −0.071
D 29 3 9.666 −0.038 3 9.666 −0.038
E 91 8 11.375 0.131 9 10.111 0.006
Total 201 20 10.05 20 10.05
Table 2: quota vs. smallest maximum admissible departure. A simple example of 5 regions
and 20 seats with the number of seats ai, the population per seat
pi
ai
and the difference from
the average δ.
In the above example the total population equals to 201 while the average
constituency size is 10.05. If we insist on applying the quota then State E must
receive at least 9 seats. As a result State A – the smallest one – gets only 2.240
The voters in State A have the least influence, nearly 30% less than on average.
On the other hand, if we apply the smallest maximum admissible departure
property, State A gets an extra seat and the largest bias is reduced to 13.8%.
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The next table shows an occurrence of population paradox when we try to
minimize the maximum admissible departure. The population of State C grows245
more rapidly than the population of State B, yet it loses a seat to State B. If
for instance we commit ourselves to the original seat distribution, where State
B gets 3 seats, the smallest maximum admissible departure jumps from 12.7%
to 16.3%. It is easy to check that the only allotment that falls within the 15%
limit proposed by the Venice Commission is the (3,4,7).250
State Population seats δi Population seats δi
A 69 3 0.114 69 3 0.003
B 70 3 0.130 80 4 -0.127
C 150 8 -0.091 172 7 0.071
Total 289 14 321 14
Table 3: Population paradox with smallest maximum admissible departure
Finally we note that the smallest maximum admissible departure prop-
erty is not compatible with house-monotonicity either. An apportionment rule
that minimizes the maximum admissible departure can produce the Alabama-
paradox.
State Population Seats piai δi Seats
pi
ai
δi
A 69 3 23 0.114 4 17.250 −0.104
B 70 3 23.333 0.130 4 17.500 −0.091
C 150 8 18.750 −0.091 7 21.428 0.112
Total 289 14 20.642 15 19.266
Table 4: House-monotonicity and smallest maximum admissible departure
Table 4 shows an example where increasing the House size from 14 to 15255
causes State C to lose a seat. State C is the largest state hence its average
constituency size changes only a little when one of its seats is assigned else-
where. A house-monotone allotment such as a = (3, 4, 8) would have a 19.3% as
smallest maximum admissible departure almost twice as much as the allotment
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in the example. This also exceeds the 15% limit of the Venice Commission’s260
recommendation, making it an unfeasible solution.
In all of the three above examples the proposed allotment was the only
one that minimized the maximum admissible departure. Hence any apportion-
ment method that satisfies the smallest maximum admissible departure property
would be inherently incompatible with the house- or population monotonicity265
properties. Therefore there is no apportionment rule that is conform with the
recommendation made by the Venice Commission and is free from the Alabama
paradox or complies with the quota-property. We consider this as a conflict
between equality among states versus equality among voters. The Venice com-
mission clearly cast its vote in favour of the second.270
4. The lexicographically optimal solution
The recommendation of the Venice Commission gives a strong constraint
for the solution of an apportionment problem. However, the set of allowable
allotments can still be large, that may leave room for arbitrary political manip-
ulations. This in turn can have a similar effect as gerrymandering. As Balinski275
and Young (1975) also argue, having a well-defined allotment rule that leads to
a unique solution is the best way to avoid political issues in the apportionment
process.
In this section we introduce such a unique rule based on the smallest maxi-
mum admissible departure property, following the recommendation of the Venice280
Commission and give an efficient algorithm to compute such a solution. Our
definition is based on the lexicographic ordering of relative differences.
What is lexicographic ordering?. The term refers to alphabetic ordering, where
the words are compared letter-by-letter and the ordering is based on the first
difference. When it comes to real vectors the ordering is based on the first coor-285
dinates where these vectors differ. Formally vector x ∈ Rm is lexicographically
smaller than y ∈ Rm (denoted by x  y) if x 6= y and there exists a number
1 ≤ j ≤ m such that xi = yi if i < j and xj < yj .
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Returning to our model, given an apportionment problem (p, H) and an
allotment a, let ∆(a) denote a nonnegative n-dimensional vector, where the290
differences di(a) are contained in a non-increasing order. A solution a is said to
be lexicographically minimal, or simply leximin, if there is no other allotment a′
where ∆(a′) is lexicographically smaller than ∆(a).
Greedy leximin algorithm
Let us refer to a ∈ Nn as a pre-allotment if the ∑i ai = H condition is295
relaxed. Let ai+ denote a pre-allotment adjusted from a, where ai+i = ai + 1
and ai+j = aj for each j 6= i. Similarly, let ai− denote a pre-allotment, where
ai−i = ai − 1 and ai−j = aj for each j 6= i. For simplicity, and to ensure the
uniqueness of the solution, we assume that di(a) is not equal to dj(a) for any
strictly positive pre-allotment a and pair of states i and j. (Note that this300
condition can be always satisfied if we perturb p, and it does not affect the
optimality of the solution.)
Phase 1: Let a[0] be a pre-allotment such that di(a[0]) is minimal for each state
i (i.e. equal to βi). Let the total number of seats allocated in a[0] be
l =
∑n
i=1 ai[0]. If l = H then STOP, a[0] is the leximin allotment.305
Phase 2: If l < H then for each t = 0, 1 . . . H − l − 1 do the following adjustment.
Let a[t+ 1] = ai+[t] for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that di(ai+[t]) is minimal.
If l > H then for each t = 0, 1 . . . l −H − 1 do the following adjustment.
Let a[t+ 1] = ai−[t] for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that di(ai−[t]) is minimal.
310
That is, we first find a pre-allotment a[0] that is lexicographically minimal
and then we simply increase (or decrease) the number of seats in a greedy way,
we add (or remove) a seat to (or from) state i if the increased difference is the
smallest for this state. In what follows we show that these greedy adjustments
lead to leximin pre-allotments in each step, and therefore a leximin allotment315
at the end of the process.
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Theorem 5. The greedy leximin algorithm results in the leximin solution for
the apportionment problem.
Proof. If
∑n
i=1 ai[0] = l = H then a[0] is the leximin allotment, obviously. Since
ai[0] =
⌊
pi
a¯
⌋
or ai[0] =
⌈
pi
a¯
⌉
for each state i, the difference |l −H| must be less320
than or equal to n.
Suppose that l < H, the case of l > H can be proved in a similar way. Let us
show by induction for t = 0, 1, . . . ,H − l, that a[t] is the leximin pre-allotment
when l+ t seats are available, so in particular, a[H − l] is the leximin allotment
for the original problem. The statement is true for t = 0, suppose that it is true325
for an arbitrary t : 0 ≤ t < H − l and let us verify the statement for t+ 1.
Suppose for a contradiction that there exists a pre-allotment b where the to-
tal number of seats allocated is l+t+1 and b is leximin among the pre-allotments
with the same number of seats, so in particular, ∆(b) is lexicographically smaller
than ∆(a[t+ 1]).330
Let a[0]≤ = {a : a[0] ≤ a}, that is set of pre-allotments where each state has
at least as many seats as in a[0]. First we shall observe that for any a ∈ a[0]≤,
di(a) < di(a
i+), i.e., when we increase the number of seats in any state i the
absolute difference from the average size in state i can only increase. This implies
that if a[0] ≤ a ≤ a′ and a 6= a′ then ∆(a) ≺ ∆(a′). The greedy algorithm335
allocates the remaining seats gradually, therefore a[0] ≤ a[1] ≤ · · · ≤ a[H − l].
Furthermore, b ∈ a[0]≤ must hold, because if bi < ai[0] for a state i then there
must be another state j such that bj > aj [0], and since di(b) > di(b
i+) ≥
di(a[0]) and dj(b) > dj(b
j−) ≥ dj(a[0]), we could decrease the departure of b
from the average size in both states i and j by moving one seat from j to i,340
contradicting to the optimality of b.
First we prove that ∆(a[t]) ≺ ∆(b). Let i be a state where bi > ai[t]
(there must be such a state since b allocates one more seat than a[t]). Then
a[0] ≤ bi− ≤ b implies ∆(bi−) ≺ ∆(b). Therefore ∆(b) ≺ ∆(a[t]) would
imply ∆(bi−) ≺ ∆(a[t]), which is in contradiction with our assumption since345
bi− is an allotment with l + t seats.
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Let us now assume that when adjusting the pre-allotment a[t] to a[t + 1]
in the greedy algorithm we increase the number of seats in country i. Suppose
that the difference di(a[t + 1]) is the rth largest, i.e., di(a[t + 1]) is the rth
entry of vector ∆(a[t + 1]). The first r − 1 entries of ∆(a[t]) and ∆(a[t + 1])350
are the same, so ∆(a[t]) ≺ ∆(b) ≺ ∆(a[t + 1]) implies that the first r − 1
entries of b are also the same, so in each of the corresponding r − 1 states
all these three pre-allotments assign the same number of seats (thus they are
identical for these r − 1 states). Regarding state i, it must be the case that
di(b) ≤ di(a[t + 1]) (otherwise b would not be lexicographically smaller than355
a[t+ 1]), therefore bi ≤ ai[t+ 1]. From the latter it follows that among the rest
of the n − r states there must be one, say j, where bj > aj [t + 1] = aj [t] since
both b and a[t+ 1] allocate l+ t+ 1 seats, and they are not identical. Therefore
bj ≥ aj [t] + 1, which implies dj(a[t]j+) ≤ dj(b). But ∆(b) ≺ ∆(a[t + 1]) also
implies dj(a[t]
j+) ≤ dj(b) < di(a[t+ 1]) = di(a[t]i+), leading to a contradiction360
with the selection of i in the greedy algorithm.
Note that both Phase 1 and Phase 2 can be conducted in n2 steps, if one
step means a comparison of two differences.
5. Data Analysis
In this section we first evaluate the 2011 Electoral Law of Hungary that365
triggered our interest in the recommendations of the Venice Commission at the
first place. Then we look at the United States House of Representatives and the
German Bundestag and discuss the allocation of seats according to the leximin
method.
5.1. Hungary370
The 2011 Electoral Law of Hungary drastically decreased the number of seats
in the parliament and fixed the number of constituencies at 106. The law also
proposed a seat distribution among the counties. Although the apportionment
method was not provided, the law prescribed some principles for subsequent
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redistribution of seats. These conditions closely followed the directives of the375
Venice Comission. The law requires that the difference between the population
of any constituency and the average constituency size should be within 15%.
The only exception is if a constituency would extend over the county border
or its connectivity could not be ensured. In these cases higher difference is
allowed, but if it ever exceeds 20% then a new allotment should be provided.380
Table 7 compares the seat distribution proposed by the law with the one that
is produced by the leximin algorithm3.
County Voters
Seats Difference (δi)
law leximin law leximin
Budapest 1 407 470 18 17 1 6.95
Baranya 325 943 4 4 5.26 5.26
Ba´cs-Kiskun 438 352 6 6 −5.63 −5.63
Be´ke´s 308 471 4 4 −0.38 −0.38
Borsod-Abau´j-Zemple´n 567 910 7 7 4.8 4.8
Csongra´d 345 945 4 5 11.72 −10.63
Feje´r 351 237 5 5 −9.26 −9.26
Gyo˝r-Moson-Sopron 364 894 5 5 −5.73 −5.73
Hajdu´-Bihar 439 618 6 6 −5.35 −5.35
Heves 257 490 3 3 10.87 10.87
Ja´sz-Nagykun-Szolnok 324 869 4 4 4.91 4.91
Koma´rom-Esztergom 255 396 3 3 9.97 9.97
No´gra´d 170 463 2 2 10.1 10.10
Pest 973 668 12 12 4.81 4.81
Somogy 268 844 4 4 −13.18 −13.18
Szabolcs-Szatma´r-Bereg 450 556 6 6 −3 −3
Tolna 196 751 3 3 −15.28 −15.28
Vas 215 773 3 3 −7.09 −7.09
3To calculate δi we used the demographic data of the 2010 election.
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Veszpre´m 300 081 4 4 −3.09 −3.09
Zala 242 236 3 3 4.3 4.3
Total 8 205 967 106 106
Table 5: The seat distribution and the differences from the average district size
by the Electoral Law and by the leximin algorithm
Note that only two out of 20 counties have a different number of seats allot-
ted. The average constituency size in Heves County is 85830 which is 30.87%
higher than the average constituency size of Tolna. Therefore voters in Tolna385
have 30.87% more influence than those living in Heves. If we allow 20% dis-
crepancy from the average constituency size then the difference between voters’
influence can be as high as 50%. Interestingly, it is not these counties where
the apportionment by law differs from the results of the 7 common methods
calculated by Bodna´r (2012), but Pest and Somogy.390
Upper bounds on the smallest maximum admissible departure
The following figure shows how the smallest maximum admissible departure
from the average constituency size (α) changes as we increase the House size
from 50 to 180. To calculate the smallest maximum admissible departure the
leximin method was used.395
Increasing House size indeed implies smaller α, although it is far from being
monotone. The upper bounds imposed by γ are clearly visible. The graph never
crosses 33.33%, and for higher H values the upper limits are 20% and 14.28%.
This implies that α coincides with β in most of the cases. A deeper analysis
shows that α = β is true for a broader range of H. From the [50, 400] interval400
there are only two exceptions, namely, when the House size equals to 87 and 88.
But even for these values it is true that α < γ. Our conjecture is that for real
life data α rarely differs from β, therefore γ can be an effective upper bound
for both. That means that if one would like to meet the Venice Commission’s
recommendation, then the House size should be set so high that the lower quota405
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Figure 1: The decline of smallest maximum admissible departure compared to increasing
House size using voter data from 2006 and 2010.
of the smallest county is at least 3 for the strict 15% limit.
Due to the demographic changes the local minimum of α shifted from 106 to
108 in four years. It can easily happen that in the near future 106 seats would
mean the local maximum for α. A solution for this issue would be to choose
the House size from an interval rather than fixing it. Although this seems to410
lead to an unpredictable system, in reality it would imply only a minor change
from one election to the next as there would be one or two counties that would
receive extra seats or have to give up one.
Monotonicity
Figure 2 shows how frequently the Alabama-paradox occurs as the House415
size changes.
The anomaly occurs only in the two largest counties4. As we mentioned ear-
lier, the explanation is simple: large counties behave as puffers. They can store
4For higher House sizes the paradox occurs in the next largest county, Borsod-Abau´j-
Zemple´n as well.
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Figure 2: The number of constituencies in Budapest and in Pest county in view of House size
constituencies without affecting the leximin ordering too much and ‘borrow’
seats for smaller counties that are crucial for the leximin ordering.420
Changing the size of the regions
Finally, another way to lower the smallest maximum admissible departure
is to increase the size of the administrative units that bundles the constituen-
cies. Instead of counties we can use regions requiring only that no constituency
extends over the region border. Table 6 summarizes the results for regions.425
For instance, Northern Hungary consists of Borsod-Abau´j-Zemple´n, Heves
and No´gra´d counties. By the law 7, 3 and 2 seats are assigned to them respec-
tively, altogether 12. Heves produces the highest difference from the average:
10.87%. However if we treat these three counties as one administrative unit
then it receives 13 seats and the sizes of its constituencies will be 76605, only430
1.05% lower than the average. In this way Western Transdanubia generates the
highest average 3.37% which is only a fraction of the 15.28% that Tolna county
produces.
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Region Voters
Number of seats Difference. (%)
law leximin law leximin
Northern Hungary 995 863 12 13 10.87 1.05
Northern Great Plain 1 215 043 16 16 5.35 1.90
Southern Great Plain 1 092 768 14 14 11.72 0.83
Central Hungary 2 381 138 30 30 4.81 2.53
Central Transdanubia 906 714 12 12 9.97 2.40
Western Transdanubia 822 903 11 11 7.09 3.37
Southern Transdanubia 791 538 11 10 15.28 2.25
Total 8 205 967 106 106
Table 6: The optimal seat distribution where no constituency extends over the region border
5.2. The German Bundestag
Similarly to the Hungarian election system, Germans voters may cast two435
votes5. The first vote decides – with simple relative majority – the fate of 299
seats. With this vote the residents can choose their candidate of choice in their
own district. The second vote is the more important one, with it the voters
can decide which party to support from the regional electoral list. Based on the
proportion of second votes, the rest of the mandates – another 299 seats – are440
distributed to the parties who have achieved at least 5 percent of valid second
votes. It may happen that according to the second votes a party should receive
less seats than it actually gained with the first votes. In such cases the party is
allowed to keep the mandates that exceed its proportional share - these are the
so called overhang seats. Indeed, after the 2013 elections the Bundestag was445
formed with 631 representatives, and this number can theoretically be as high
as 897.
Here we analyze the seats that are elected directly with the first votes using
data from the 2013 elections (?). The average constituency size is 207 180.
5The resemblance is not by chance. The German election system was a case model when
the Hungarian Electoral Law was first scripted in 1989.
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Although the leximin algorithm refines the seat distribution a little, it cannot450
change the enormous bias caused by Bremen, where the average constituency
size is 241 912 (+16.76%). Furthermore, the constituencies of Bremen are not of
the same size – the larger of the two has 256 547 voters (+23.83%). Interestingly,
this does not even produce the largest difference. The Hamburg-Mitte district
– the central district of Hamburg – has an even higher number of voters, 256455
862 voters (+23.98%), while Deggendorf in Bayern has 155 082 or -25.15%
that is even larger difference. These examples show that creating equally sized
constituencies within an administrative region may cause further complications.
For more on the apportionment issues related to the German election system
see (?).460
County Voters
Seats Difference (δi)
law leximin law leximin
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 7 689 895 38 37 −2.32 0.32
Bayern 9 472 738 45 46 1.60 −0.60
Berlin 2 505 718 12 12 0.79 0.79
Brandenburg 2 065 944 10 10 −0.28 −0.28
Bremen 483 823 2 2 16.76 16.76
Hamburg 1 281 918 6 6 3.12 3.12
Hessen 4 413 271 22 21 −3.17 1.44
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 1 350 705 6 7 8.66 −6.86
Niedersachsen 6 117 473 30 30 −1.58 −1.58
Nordrhein-Westfalen 13 253 554 64 64 −0.05 −0.05
Rheinland-Pfalz 3 092 424 15 15 −0.49 −0.49
Saarland 796 072 4 4 −3.94 −3.94
Sachsen 3 406 430 16 16 2.76 2.76
Sachsen-Anhalt 1 930 880 9 9 3.55 3.55
Schleswig-Holstein 2 251 796 11 11 −1.19 −1.19
Thu¨ringen 1 834 259 9 9 −1.63 −1.63
Total 61 946 900 299 299
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Table 7: The seat distribution and the differences from the average district size
in the Bundestag in the 2013 elections compared with the same data induced
by the leximin algorithm
5.3. The United States House of Representatives
Much of the literature of apportionment is based on the problems encoun-
tered at the regular updates of seat allocation in the United States House of
Representatives. In the following we explain how and why our recommended al-
location for the US House of Representatives differs and how the current method465
fares in general when compared with our leximin approach.
5.3.1. The leximin vs. the equal proportions method
To further illustrate the properties of the leximin rule let us compare it with
the equal proportion (EP) method (Huntington, 1921), that is used to distribute
the seats of the US House of Representatives. The method of Equal Proportions470
first distributes one seat to each state, then the remaining seats are allocated
one at a time, to the state with the highest ‘priority number’. Priority of state
i is determined by the formula pi√
k(k+1)
, where k runs from 1 until all the seats
are distributed. It is a house-monotone apportionment rule, but it does not
satisfy quota (although it rarely produces a non-quota solution). The table475
of the apportionment of the 2010 US census compared with the result of the
leximin algorithm can be found in the appendix Appendix A; Figure 3 provides
a visual summary.
The two resulting allotments are very similar. In fact there are only two
states where the solutions differ: California and Montana. The scenario is480
the same we have seen before. The largest state lends a seat to one of the
smaller ones and the smallest maximum admissible departure drops by almost
10%. It is quite surprising that the voters of Rhode Island - where the average
constituency size is the smallest - have 88% more influence than the voters of
Montana. Although the leximin allotment reduces this gap somewhat, the only485
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Figure 3: The number of citizens per representative according to the leximin method (in
thousands). In parentheses the same figure for the EP method (where different). Note the
dramatic swing for Montana.
efficient solution would be to drastically increase the House size. As there are 50
states and seven among them end up with only one representative each, the size
of the House of Representatives can be considered rather small. Figure 4 shows
how the smallest maximum admissible departure changes for higher House sizes.
Smallest maximum admissible departures490
As it can be anticipated the smallest maximum admissible departure of the
leximin solution never exceeds 33.3% however for the EP there is no such limit.
To make certain that the smallest maximum admissible departure is below 20%
we have to ensure that the smallest state, Wyoming a) receives at least two
representatives and b) the constituency size obtained this way is within 20%495
of the average. A simple calculation shows that the smallest House size that
guarantees these two criteria is 871 - a little more than twice its current size.
As it is unlikely that the House of Representatives will be expanded in such
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Figure 4: The smallest maximum admissible departure in view of the House size
fashion the influence of the voters will continue to vary from state to state. A
temporary solution would be to increase the number of representatives by seven.500
The smallest maximum admissible departure for both the leximin and the EP
solution meets its minimum at House size 442. In that case the highest gap
between voters influence is ‘only’ 55.19%.
6. Conclusion
More and more countries adopt fairness measures in their electoral law that is505
based on, or similar to the recommendation of the Venice Commission (2002a).
Based on the smallest maximum admissible departure property we introduce
the well-defined Leximin Rule.
Our apportionment method is not the first. The problem of apportionment
goes centuries back, the problem has been around ever since the new member510
states and population changes required a new seat allocation in the US House of
Representatives. Balinski and Young (1982) give an illuminating theoretical and
historical overview of the problem of apportionment and the political debates
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that arose due to it. Methods like Hamilton’s (also called the Method of Largest
Remainders), Jefferson’s (Method of Greatest Divisors, but in Europe often515
referenced as the d’Hondt method), or the Huntingdon-Hill or Equal Proportions
method, the currently used method in the US House of Representatives have
all been developed as responses to practical problems with apportionment such
as the emergence of one or another paradox. Lauwers and Van Puyenbroeck
(2006) compare some of these methods.520
Apportionment problems are most often used for allocating seats among
administrative or political regions based on the population size of these regions:
states in the US House of Representatives, countries in the EU parliament and
so on. Our paper focuses on these applications. Apportionment is also used
for the allotment of seats to parties based on the outcome of an election, in525
fact, sometimes both segmentations appear at the same time; the so-called bi-
apportionment is used in some European countries and the problem has been
studied by Demange (2012) and Serafini and Simeone (2012).
The Lexicographic Rule is, to the best of our knowledge, an original appor-
tionment method, although lexicographic solution concepts have already been530
proposed by Gambarelli (1999) and Gambarelli and Palestini (2007). The clos-
est model is by Serafini and Simeone (2012), where the relative differences from
the target quotas are lexicographically minimized in the bi-apportionment prob-
lem. However, their target quotas are not the same as ours (when restricted to
a one-dimensional case), and their methods proposed are more complex, since535
they are designed for the more general bi-apportionment problem.
There are also papers on minimizing the relative difference over pairs of
constituencies. Burt and Harris (1963) proposed this concept in for the US
House of Representatives, but then it got criticized by Gilbert and Schatz (1964).
A recent overview on this concept is given by Edelman (2006). Our problem540
is different from this one, and it is easy to construct an example where the
solutions minimizing the relative difference of any two constituencies and the
maximum departure from the average size differ. So far, it seems, none of these
models are compatible with the recommendation of the Venice Commission.
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The smallest maximum admissible departure property is very natural and545
provides greater equality among citizens concerning their voting power than
other apportionment principles. Unfortunately, the property and therefore the
Leximin Rule turn out to be incompatible with the quota, the population- and
house-monotonicities over the class of apportionment problems, so that the Al-
abama and population paradoxes may arise when using it. It seems we have550
just introduced a new method that fails all existing industry standards! Indeed
these properties emerged over century-long debates over the election rules for
the US House of Representatives and cannot be just ignored. On the other hand
the proposal of the Venice Commission is a very natural and plausible one, it is
comparable to the quota, while the violations of monotonicity are hardly sur-555
prising in an integer problem. The fact that more and more countries consider
the smallest maximum admissible departure property as its de facto standard
to evaluate, improve and design apportionment among regions may be seen as
an indication that this is a natural and valid property whose incompatibility
with some old thoughts from the New World is interesting to be aware of, but560
is perhaps time to update them in a representative democracy. And finally, a
third reading is just to note the emergence of two incompatible schools of ap-
portionment that may coexist thanks to minor differences in our understanding
of representative democracy.
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Appendix A. The seat distribution of the US House of Representa-
tives by the equal proportion method and by the lex-
imin algorithm
State Voters
Number of seats Difference (%)
EP leximin EP leximin
Alabama 4 802 982 7 7 3.46 3.46
Alaska 721 523 1 1 1.51 1.51
Arizona 6 412 700 9 9 0.24 0.24
Arkansas 2 926 229 4 4 2.92 2.92
California 37341989 53 52 0.87 1.03
Colorado 5 044 930 7 7 1.39 1.39
Connecticut 3 581 628 5 5 0.78 0.78
Delaware 900 877 1 1 26.74 26.74
Florida 18 900 773 27 27 1.51 1.51
Georgia 9 727 566 14 14 2.24 2.24
Hawaii 1 366 862 2 2 3.84 3.84
Idaho 1 573 499 2 2 10.69 10.69
Illinois 12 864 380 18 18 0.55 0.55
Indiana 6 501 582 9 9 1.63 1.63
Iowa 3 053 787 4 4 7.41 7.41
Kansas 2 863 813 4 4 0.72 0.72
Kentucky 4 350 606 6 6 2.01 2.01
Louisiana 4 553 962 6 6 6.78 6.78
Maine 1 333 074 2 2 6.22 6.22
Maryland 5 789 929 8 8 1.82 1.82
Massachusetts 6 559 644 9 9 2.54 2.54
Michigan 9 911 626 14 14 0.39 0.39
Minnesota 5 314 879 8 8 6.52 6.52
Mississippi 2 978 240 4 4 4.75 4.75
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Missouri 6 011 478 8 8 5.72 5.72
Montana 994416 1 2 39.90 30.04
Nebraska 1 831 825 3 3 14.09 14.09
Nevada 2 709 432 4 4 4.70 4.70
New Hampshire 1 321 445 2 2 7.04 7.04
New Jersey 8 807 501 12 12 3.26 3.26
New Mexico 2 067 273 3 3 3.04 3.04
New York 19 421 055 27 27 1.20 1.20
North Carolina 9 565 781 13 13 3.52 3.52
North Dakota 675 905 1 1 4.90 4.90
Ohio 11 568 495 16 16 1.72 1.72
Oklahoma 3 764 882 5 5 5.93 5.93
Oregon 3 848 606 5 5 8.29 8.29
Pennsylvania 12 734 905 18 18 0.46 0.46
Rhode Island 1 055 247 2 2 25.76 25.76
South Carolina 4 645 975 7 7 6.62 6.62
South Dakota 819 761 1 1 15.33 15.33
Tennessee 6 375 431 9 9 0.33 0.33
Texas 25 268 418 36 36 1.24 1.24
Utah 2 770 765 4 4 2.54 2.54
Vermont 630 337 1 1 11.31 11.31
Virginia 8 037 736 11 11 2.80 2.80
Washington 6 753 369 10 10 4.98 4.98
West Virginia 1 859 815 3 3 12.77 12.77
Wisconsin 5 698 230 8 8 0.21 0.21
Wyoming 568 300 1 1 20.04 20.04
Total 309 183 463 435 435 max : 39.9 max : 30.04
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